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**Matter Of Fact****'Pentagon is Hard to Partition'****By Joseph and Stewart Alsop**

NEW YORK.—Next to the foreign policy line (which it must deeply affect), the character of President-elect Eisenhower's Defense Department is the most important thing to know about in the new Administration.

The evidence, as disclosed by careful inquiry among the men around Eisenhower, is extremely conflicting. On the one hand, there are strong hints that the new President expects the civilian chiefs of the Pentagon to supervise procurement and production, while the uniformed Chiefs of Staff make the "military" decisions.

This is suggested by Eisenhower's selection of five exceedingly able and important business leaders for the top Defense Department offices. It is also suggested by Eisenhower's well-known intention to bring into the Joint Chiefs of Staff a team of men who command his personal confidence.

The men most often mentioned are Gen. Alfred Gruenther for the Army, Gen. Lauris Norstad for the Air Force, Admiral Arthur Radford for the Navy, and Gen. W. Bedell Smith as chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

ON THE OTHER HAND, returns of a rather different nature have now come in from the Washington briefing of the prospective Defense Secretary, Charles E. Wilson, and his staff by incumbent Secretary Robert A. Lovett and his coworkers.

One of the day's more significant moments occurred when Wilson asked Lovett how much time he would have to devote to problems like congressional relations, relations with other nations arising from the foreign military aid program, and so on. Lovett replied that these would take about half his time. Wilson then asked how much time he would have left for the production program. About 10 percent, was Lovett's estimate.

There is no doubt the new Eisenhower defense appointees originally thought they would busy themselves mainly with organizing production and enforcing economy. But already, this illusion is passing.

Already, it is becoming plain to these key men of the Eisenhower Cabinet that there is no such thing as a purely "military" decision on the highest level. Already they are grasping the central point that all so-called military decisions on this level have the most extensive political implications, both at home and abroad.

A symptom of this growing awareness is the desire of Wilson to avoid a complete break with the past. At least two of the key civilian

officials in the Pentagon are to be kept on, in effect in civil service status.

MEANWHILE, President-elect Eisenhower himself is also giving some pretty striking indications of his own viewpoint on defense organization. At the moment, for instance, he is giving serious consideration to a plan for transferring final authority over all promotion of the higher general offices to the civilian Secretary of Defense. Control of promotions is, of course, the secret of supremacy. When this very great increase in the power of the civilian Secretary was first proposed to him, Eisenhower is reported to have reacted with a characteristic, "By golly, now we've got them."

By "them" Eisenhower unquestionably meant the great numbers of men in the services who place service interest ahead of national interest. The need for true unification is a subject on which the incoming President is very hot under the collar. He talks often about it, and he talks indignantly.

On this point also, a reliable source has quoted him as follows:

"No one who hasn't been in the middle of it can possibly understand how bitter and costly the rivalry between the services is. That's what killed poor Jim Forrestal—that and the fact that he could always see both sides of every question."

ALTOGETHER, it is hard to believe. "the civilians are to do production and the generals are to do military" in the Eisenhower Defense Department, as one happy general hopefully forecast. Even if some traces of this conception of defense organization survive at the outset, they are bound to be wiped out by the pressure of events.

The real question that then remains to be answered is how far the inevitable drive to economize will carry President-elect Eisenhower and his defense subordinates. On this matter, inquiry discloses that the new civilian heads of the Defense Department still cherish some illusions.

They think greater "efficiency" can save a lot of money in the Defense Department. They have still to discover that real economies can be made only if they reexamine such great strategic questions as the armed forces levels, and if they tackle the vital problems involved in weapons systems and tables of organization and equipment. Nonetheless, all should be well if the new men stick to their reported motto, which is, "More fighting power for less investment of men and resources."